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Finally, the court concluded that Clark County violated the CWA.
Liability under the CWA requires that a party must: (1) discharge; (2)
pollutants; (3) to navigable waters; (4) from point sources; (5) without
an NPDES permit. Since all elements were present in this case, the
court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and found
Clark County liable for violating the CWA.
Michael Fischer

STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent Marina, Inc., 702 So. 2d 472
(Civ. App. Ala. 1997) (holding that the trial court erred in applying
the two-year residual statute of limitations to allegations derived from
a claim of riparian rights of access to the waters of Terry Cove by virtue
of ownership of property directly facing Terry Cove).
Cove Properties, Inc. ("Cove") appealed from a judgment
dismissing its claims against Walter Trent Marina ("Marina") on the
basis that Cove's claims were barred by the two-year residual statute of
limitations. Cove and the Marina were adjoining landowners of
property fronting Terry Cove in Orange Beach, Alabama. The Marina
had erected a pier that crossed a line extending into the water of Terry
Cove from the parties' land boundary.
Cove sued under various theories all based upon its riparian water
rights of access to the waters of Terry Cove by virtue of its ownership of
property directly facing Terry Cove. The lower court dismissed the
action as barred by the two-year residual injury statute of limitations.
On appeal, Cove argued that its claims should not be subject to the
statute of limitations. Cove analogized its riparian rights to access the
water fronting its lot to the rights of a fee simple landowner to
possession of his or her land, arguing that its claims should be subject
to the statute of limitations governing recovery of interests in land, or,
alternatively, trespass to real or personal property.
In reviewing Cove's claims, the court held that the rights Cove
sought to vindicate were appurtenant to its riparian tract and were
corporeal hereditaments inuring to its tract. Thus, the ten-year
statute of limitations for actions for the recovery of lands, tenements,
or hereditaments, or the possession thereof, properly applied.
CarolinePayne

